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Non technical summary 
Germany has the highest unemployment rate of older people in comparison to the average 
unemployment rate of all developed economies. Obviously older people face stronger 
difficulties to re-enter the labour market after a non-employment spell. This contribution 
analyses if these difficulties also lead to higher earnings losses of older employees after 
re-entering the labour market. More specifically, this paper calculates the relative earnings 
of employees before and after a non-employment spell and compares them with the 
earnings of employees without non-employment spells. 
Splitting employees into four age groups shows that older employees who lose 
their jobs face higher earnings losses. A couple of years before non-employment older 
employees still earn more than employees with comparable observable characteristics 
without non-employment spells. This earnings advantage turns into a strong disadvantage 
directly before the non-employment spell. Younger employees have a relatively constant 
earnings disadvantage before non-employment, however. One year after the non-
employment spell, younger employees earn at least what their comparison group without 
non-employment spells earns.  By contrast, older employees start one year after their non-
employment spell with an earnings disadvantage of up to ten percent and even face 
measureable earnings losses six years after non-employment. 
There are several reasons for higher earnings losses of older employees after non-
employment – they have higher specific human capital investments, higher seniority 
earnings, and more frequently have to change jobs involuntary than younger employees. 
Finally, older employees with non-employment spells might more frequently be employed 
in enterprises in economic trouble. A comparison of the earnings losses of those 
employees who re-enter the same company after non-employment suggests the 
prevalence of the latest reason – younger employees get an earnings premium when they 
re-enter their previous employer and older employees face an earnings loss in comparison 
to those employees who find a job at another employer after non-employment. 
  
Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
Deutschland weist unter allen entwickelten Volkswirtschaften die höchste 
Arbeitslosenquote Älterer im Vergleich zur durchschnittlichen Arbeitslosenquote auf. 
Ältere haben größere Schwierigkeiten, nach einer Arbeitsunterbrechung in den 
Arbeitsmarkt zurück zu kommen. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob diese Schwierigkeiten auch 
zu höheren Lohnabschlägen Älterer beim Wiedereintritt in Beschäftigung führen. Konkret 
wird der mit einer Erwerbslosigkeitsperiode verbundene Lohnabschlag bis zu sechs Jahre 
vor und nach einer Arbeitsunterbrechung berechnet.  
Bei einer Unterscheidung der Beschäftigten nach Altersgruppen zeigt sich, dass 
ältere Beschäftigte stärkere Lohneinbussen bei Arbeitsunterbrechungen hinnehmen 
müssen als jüngere Beschäftigte. Weit vor einer Erwerbslosigkeitsperiode haben ältere 
Beschäftigte noch höhere Löhne als Beschäftigte mit den gleichen beobachtbaren 
Eigenschaften aber ohne spätere Arbeitsunterbrechung. Dieser Einkommensvorteil 
wandelt sich in den letzten Jahren vor der Arbeitsunterbrechung in einen gravierenden 
Einkommensnachteil. Jüngere Beschäftigte hingegen sehen sich vor der Erwerbslosigkeit 
einem relativ konstanten Einkommensabschlag gegenüber. Ein Jahr nach der 
Arbeitsunterbrechung verdienen jüngere Beschäftigte bereits wieder mindestens genauso 
viel wie Gleichaltrige ohne Erwerbsunterbrechung. Die älteren Beschäftigten starten im 
Jahr nach ihrer Erwerbslosigkeit mit Abschlägen bis zu zehn Prozent, die sich zwar 
verringern, jedoch auch sechs Jahre nach der Erwerbslosigkeit noch messbar sind. 
Es gibt mehrere Gründe, weshalb ältere Beschäftigte einen höheren Lohnabschlag 
akzeptieren müssen als jüngere Beschäftigte, wenn sie nach Erwerbslosigkeit wieder in 
Beschäftigung kommen. Sie verlieren möglicherweise mehr spezifisches Humankapital 
und bekamen beim vorherigen Arbeitgeber einen Senioritätsaufschlag.  Zudem wechseln 
jüngere Beschäftigte häufiger freiwillig den Arbeitgeber, um die Passgenauigkeit ihres 
Arbeitsplatzes zu erhöhen. Ein letzter Grund könnte darin liegen, dass ältere Arbeitnehmer 
mit Erwerbslosigkeitsperioden in Unternehmen mit wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten 
beschäftigt sind und deshalb unfreiwillig arbeitslos werden. Ein Vergleich der 
Lohnabschläge der Beschäftigten, die nach Erwerbslosigkeit wieder im gleichen 
Unternehmen arbeiten, legt die letzte Erklärung nahe – jüngere Beschäftigte erhalten 
einen Lohnaufschlag, während ältere Beschäftigte einen Lohnabschlag gegenüber 
denjenigen erhalten, die nach einer Arbeitsunterbrechung einen Arbeitsplatz bei einem 
anderen Unternehmen erhalten. 
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Abstract 
This paper shows that earnings losses after unemployment increase with age. First, older 
employees start out with relatively high earnings in comparison to employees without 
employment interruptions several years before the non-employment spell. This earnings 
advantage turns into a strong earnings disadvantage shortly before the non-employment 
spell. Younger unemployed have a relatively stable and small earnings disadvantage 
before non-employment. Second, while the younger employees quickly enjoy earnings 
higher than those without employment interruptions after the non-employment spell, 
earnings for older employees are lower even six years after the unemployment spell. If 
those with non-employment spells re-enter the labour market at the same employer, the 
earnings impact is the more positive the younger the employee. This paper uses 
representative administrative spell data for 1993-2001 that allow us to take into account 
the precise length of all non-employment spells and calculate the exact dates before and 
after the spells. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper looks into the anatomy of earnings losses before and after non-employment in 
Germany by age. There are a couple of reasons why earnings losses can differ depending 
on the age of those affected by non-employment. Search theory asserts that younger 
employees switch jobs in order to improve their job match while older employees can find 
it hard to improve their match (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). This means that younger 
employees more frequently switch employers voluntarily even accepting non-employment 
spells and older employees mainly lose their job involuntarily. Another argument in this 
vein is that enterprises in economic trouble frequently have an older work force because 
they could not hire new younger employees for a longer time span. They may have to set 
free older employees temporarily in order to survive. In addition, older employees have 
more to lose from a reduction in seniority than younger employees in the wake of a non-
employment spell because earnings increase with seniority and an older job entrant gets 
compared with employees with long seniority spells (Lazear, 1979; Zwick, 2008). Finally, 
older workers may have accumulated more specific human capital that is lost after 
switching the employer. 
Earnings losses may begin prior to non-employment and measuring earnings losses by 
comparing only the final earnings on the job from which the worker was displaced with the 
new earnings is likely to underestimate the size of these losses. In this paper, therefore 
the approach by Jacobson et al. (1993) is used that includes earnings comparisons several 
years before and after the non-employment spell. This paper presents mainly two 
extensions to the literature on earnings losses before and after non-employment. First, it 
uses rich individual spell data to construct yearly separation dummies until six years 
before and after all non-employment spells. So far, earnings losses are calculated mainly 
on the basis of quarterly or yearly data. This means that short non-employment spells 
cannot be accounted for. In addition, we know the exact begin and end point of the non-
employment spells and therefore can determine the precise point in time when an 
earnings spell is say two years before the non-employment spell or three years after. We 
can also calculate the impact of different non-employment spell lengths on earnings after 
the separation. Second, this paper differentiates between the non-employment effects of 
different age groups and gender. It hereby demonstrates that earnings losses increase 
with age. In addition, a first attempt is made to empirically validate the different 
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hypotheses mentioned above on the sources of the differences in earnings losses 
between age groups. The empirical strategy is to interact earnings losses with a dummy 
that equals one for those who re-enter the labour market at the same employer. 
The next section contains an overview over the empirical literature on earnings losses 
of displaced workers. Section three describes the estimation strategy and section four the 
data used. Section five presents the estimation results and section six concludes. 
2 Earnings losses of displaced workers – a literature review 
Addison and Portugal (1989) analyse wage losses incurred by job displacement using the 
US Displaced Worker Survey, a supplement to the Current Population Survey. While they 
are careful in taking into account tenure and experience before unemployment as well as 
unemployment duration, they only compare wages of workers displaced between 1979 
and 1984 on a certain point in time before and after unemployment. Houle and Oudenrode 
(1994) replicate Addison and Portugal´s (1989) study using Canadian data. In both 
studies unemployment duration is not perfectly measured and it is not clear if the job 
observed is the first one after unemployment. The Canadian study finds a lower impact of 
unemployment on wage losses than the US study and confirms the observation that 
previous tenure increases wage losses. Houle and Oudenrode (1994) stress that 
frequently working time before unemployment decreases and it is therefore important 
either to observe working hours directly or exclude employees with part time spells. Both 
papers provide a snapshot view of short-term earnings losses focusing solely on workers 
who have been displaced. Since they do not account for the earnings growth that would 
have occurred in the absence of job losses, the are likely to underestimate the magnitude 
of wage losses. 
Burda and Mertens (2001) use the German GSOEP in order to predict displacement 
status on a sample of employees in the social security file of the IAB (IABS). They include a 
dummy on the displacement status in a wage growth model containing only employees 
who became unemployed in 1986, i.e. they only compare the wage development at a 
certain point in time for employees with previous unemployment spells. They find that the 
wage loss is economically insignificant for those re-employed at their previous employer, 
while the wage loss is only 3.6% for those re-employed at another employer.  
Arulampalam (2001) explores the structure of the earnings losses in more detail by 
observing them until four years after the unemployment spell and even in the second job 
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after unemployment. She uses the representative British Household Panel Survey that 
includes employees with and without unemployment spells and includes a broad range of 
variables related to individual wages. She finds that unemployment carries a wage penalty 
of 6% on re-entry while the gap widens to 14% after three years. The wage loss is also 
carried to the second job after unemployment.  
Lefranc (2003) tries to disentangle the loss of seniority-accumulated firm-specific 
earnings potential and changes in the match heterogeneity after unemployment spells, i.e. 
categorise the losses into type and tenure. On the basis of yearly data for France and the 
United States, he uses a difference in difference model where wage differences are 
regressed on a dummy that is one if somebody experienced a job displacement. He adds 
an interaction term between the job loss dummy and tenure in the previous job and finds a 
negative correlation. Finally, he first provides a consistent estimate of seniority wages on 
the basis of the method by Topel (1991) and calculates the wage development minus the 
seniority component in order to identify the size of both reasons for wage losses – average 
match or firm quality and loss of seniority. He finds that in France the wage loss is mainly 
due to the loss of accumulated firm specific earnings potential, while in the US, more than 
half of measured wage losses arise from a downgrading into lower quality job matches. 
Carneiro and Portugal (2006) measure the earnings losses of Portuguese workers. 
They use a linked employer-employee data set containing three yearly earnings before and 
after unemployment. They use observations for all employees who became unemployed in 
1994, 1995 or 1996. Individuals in the “experiment” group must have been in the same 
firm for at least three years before losing the job. They construct three control groups. In 
each year the experiment group might have lost the job, 300´000 employees are randomly 
drawn who work in a firm that did not close down in the respective year and who worked 
there at least for two years in the year preceding the year the experiment group lost the 
job. They found that earnings losses are around 10% and lasting in Portugal. After adding 
tenure to the earnings equation, they argue that the loss of tenure accounts for a large 
share of the wage loss. Also employer characteristics and the length of unemployment 
spells explain a large part of the earnings loss. 
 Jacobson et al. (1993) were the first to point out that the measurement of the wage 
loss strongly depends on the points in time before and after unemployment because the 
earnings of those who finally get unemployed begin to decline already several years before 
the actual unemployment event. It is therefore not only important to observe the wage 
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development several years before and after the unemployment spell, but also to compare 
the wage development of the unemployed with employees with uninterrupted careers. 
Their data have the disadvantage that they observe labour market status and wages only 
at a fixed quarterly date. In addition, there is no indication of working hours, and 
observations disappear if employees move from the state of Pennsylvania to other 
regions. The authors therefore do not observe shorter unemployment spells and they 
cannot identify if wage reductions are a consequence of shorter working hours. They also 
constrain their sample to high tenure employees until 50 years of age in firms above 50 
employees. They find substantial earnings losses for those employees with unemployment 
spells starting already three years prior to the actual spell. The losses are larger for 
younger employees, employees with higher tenure, those previously employed in larger 
firms, and males. The larger wage losses of younger employees are compensated by 
stronger relative wage increases after several quarters in employment, however. 
 Bender et al. (2002) estimate wage losses from unemployment for France and 
Germany. They use administrative data from the Employment Sample of the IAB (IABS) 
plus additional plant information for Germany and the Annual Social Data Reports (DADS) 
and the Permanent Dynamic Sample (EDP) for France. They take into account the wage 
development before the unemployment spell, use daily earnings instead of earnings 
during a larger time period that may contain unemployment periods and they differentiate 
between displacements caused by plant closures and other displacements (such as quits 
or dismissals) Finally, they take into account non-employment spells in addition to 
unemployment spells. They restrict their analysis to high-attachment prime age males who 
have stayed with a single firm for at least four years. The authors find that unemployment 
wage losses are insignificant in France and less than one percent in Germany. There are 
high wage losses, however, for those who are unemployed for more than one year (the 
effect is 5% in France and between 13 and 20% in Germany). 
3 Estimation Strategy 
The estimation strategy of this paper draws on Jacobson et al. (1993) and Bender et al. 
(2002). The sample of workers is not reduced, however, by only keeping workers with a 
high attachment to their employers before non-employment. This paper calculates the 
impact of non-employment spells on earnings until six years before and after. Only non-
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employment spells longer than five days are taken into account.2 In addition, only non-
employment spells are included of those who re-entered the labour market, because we 
want to have the same sample of employees with non-employment spells before and after 
the employment interruption occurs. All employment interruptions are included and not 
only those of displaced workers. The main reason for this decision is that the ZA sample of 
the IABS does not contain the date when establishments´ identification numbers 
disappear. This is the information used for example by Bender et al. (2002) in order to sort 
out establishments that closed down not longer than two years after unemployment entry. 
These establishments might not actually have closed down however but they might have 
been bought by another establishment or re-organised fundamentally and therefore 
changed their establishment identifier. Another option to identify displaced workers would 
have been to use steep employment decreases as an indicator for mass lay-offs. This 
option is also not possible here because we do not have the information on establishment 
size and we cannot construct it from our sample. In addition, we cannot observe if an 
establishment with a very similar work force re-appears under a different establishment 
indicator because we only have a small sample of the workforce. This also means that we 
cannot discern the earnings effects of employees at different dates before an 
establishment closes down (Schwerdt, 2008) and we cannot discern voluntary and 
involuntary separations. This means that the effects observed are mainly descriptive and 
not causal upon involuntary job displacement. 
The main advantage of the spell data set is that we observe all non-employment 
spells and not only those spells occurring at the day of observation in quarterly or yearly 
data. In contrast to Jacobson et al. (1993), earnings are not set to zero during non-
employment (and included in the regression) but only earnings during employment spells 
are observed. According to the earnings loss literature, gender, age, nationality, 
qualification, year dummies, and economic sector are included as explanatory variables. 
In addition, based on the results from the search and seniority wage literature (Zwick, 
2008) that tenure matters for wage formation, also tenure in the current job is included. 
Finally, this paper is more specific about the impact of non-employment than most 
contributions to the earnings loss literature by not only including a dummy indicating if 
non-employment was longer than one year but by including a series of non-employment 
                                                          
2 Non-employment spells until one week are excluded in order to keep out purely frictional non-
employment spells where the employees had a new job already before they went into non-employment. 
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spell dummies. This gives us larger flexibility.3 In order to observe the earnings 
development before and after unemployment, separation dummies are introduced that 
indicate if the earnings observation is one until six years before or after a non-employment 
spell. 
The empirical model is defined as follows:  
´ ´ .kit i t it it k it
k m
y Z X Dα γ β δ ε
≥−
= + + + +∑  
Here yit is individual (log) earnings in spell t, Zi indicates a vector of the time invariant 
characteristics of the employee and his or her employer, γt are year dummies, and the 
vector Xit comprises time variable individual characteristics of the employees relevant for 
the wage. The dummy variables D finally have value one, if the earnings observation is 
from one until six years before the start of a non-employment spell or one until six years 
after the end of a non-employment spell, i.e. m=6 and k=1,..,12. We use spell data and 
therefore observe non-employment spells with a daily accuracy. If, for example, non-
employment started on May 1st 1999 and ended on July 1st 1999, the separation dummy 
one year before is measured on the spell that covers May 1st 1998 and the separation 
dummy one year after at spell on July 1st 2000.  
 Based on previous studies, several hypotheses on the impact of the covariates on 
earnings are straightforward (Bender et al.; 2002, Schwerdt, 2008; Zwick, 2008): A higher 
qualification level, age and tenure should have a positive and non-employment a negative 
impact on earnings. Foreigners and women should earn less. There are also several 
arguments that earnings losses should increase with age. First, younger employees 
frequently voluntarily change their employers – even accepting a non-employment spell – 
in order to improve their job match (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). The chances are 
smaller for older employees that they can improve their match further. The share of 
involuntary separations might also be larger for older employees because they work in 
enterprises in economic troubles. These enterprises frequently have an older work force 
than comparable enterprises because they were not able to hire younger employees for a 
certain time span. Second, earnings increase with seniority and therefore entrants ceteris 
paribus earn lower earnings (Lazear, 1979). Especially older entrants therefore have a 
larger earnings disadvantage because they get compared with employees with long 
seniority. Especially in Germany, deferred seniority wage patterns seem to be rather steep 
                                                          
3 It is found that wages decrease with previous unemployment, but not linearly or quadratically. 
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in an international comparison (Zwick, 2008) and this might also lead to relatively high 
wage losses for older employees in comparison to younger employees. Finally, older 
employees might have invested more in specific human capital and these investments are 
lost after the change of employers. We can find an indication which of these reasons is 
more prevalent by interacting the earnings loss indicator with a dummy for those who re-
enter the labour market at the same employer. The first reason – involuntary job loss 
because the employer is in economic trouble – should lead to a negative coefficient for the 
interaction term. The other two reasons – loss of specific human capital and seniority – 
should lead to a positive coefficient for the interaction term. 
In order to test the hypotheses, the sample of employees between 20 and 60 years of 
age is split into 10 year age brackets and between both genders. Robustness checks 
include an indicator which equals one if the establishment after re-employment is the 
same as the employer before unemployment. 
4 Data 
For this inquiry, we use the scientific use file of the employee statistics of the IAB (IABS) 
provided by the Zentralarchiv in Cologne (ZA), for further information see Bender et al. 
(1996; 2002). The register data of the IABS comprise data of the employment biography of 
two percent of the employees and unemployed covered by the social security system for 
the period 1975 until 2001 – this means more than 80% of all potential employees. 
Excluded from these data are the self-employed, civil servants, and workers with a very 
small income. The Employment Statistics give continuous information on employment 
spells, earnings, job and personal characteristics. They are based on microdata delivered 
by firms about their individual employees. The same is done if the employee changes 
employment or the employer or if there are changes in the social insurance payment 
obligations such as earnings changes. The duration of a spell is computed not in days 
worked but in calendar days. Originally, the data of the employment statistics were taken 
over for administrative purposes of the social security system and were collected by the 
Federal Employment Agency. Since they are used to calculate the pensions of retired 
people, the income and spell duration information are very reliable. For example, no 
problem of recall or reporting is encountered as in population surveys. 
On the basis of these spell data, we can identify periods of employment and non-
employment on a daily basis for a large and representative sample of individuals for a long 
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time period. Specifically, we also observe short periods of non-employment or 
employment that are unobservable in quarterly or yearly data. In addition, we can mark 
periods before and after non-employment spells with a daily accuracy. 
 The earnings variable is measured for calendar days. It is deflated by the consumer 
price index calculated by the German Federal Statistical Office. Earnings are censored at 
the contribution assessment ceiling of the social security system. This relates to about 
10% of the employment spells. We therefore first identify, whose earnings are censored on 
the basis of the official social security contribution thresholds that change every year and 
differ for Eastern and Western Germany. The earnings regressions take account of the 
individual censoring by using censored normal regressions.4 We only can identify the 
censoring for both parts of the country since 1992 and therefore earnings spells are not 
used before 1992.  
Tenure and experience are also censored for spells starting before 1960 for West 
Germany and 1990 for East Germany. Therefore experience is replaced by age which is a 
good indicator for potential experience and the censored tenure variables are imputed 
(this concerns 4.1% of the spells in West and 6.7% of the spells in East Germany). The 
imputation is executed by creating 20 cells differentiated by gender, education (six 
schooling groups) and nationality (German versus non-German), and running censored 
regressions for each cell. The covariates comprise age, age square, eight dummies for 
school and professional qualification and sixteen binary variables for sector (compare also 
Gartner, 2005). Predicted tenure for each censored observation is then calculated and 
assigned for each spell. 
This paper includes employees aged 20-60 in order to examine the entire age 
spectrum. Only full time employees are included in order to avoid biases because we know 
that frequently hours worked decrease prior to non-employment (Houle and van 
Audenrode, 1995) and we do not know the exact number of hours worked. Finally, only 
observations of those employees are included who return to work after a non-employment 
spell and those with uninterrupted employment spells. 
In order to capture relevant further elements for individual earnings, a broad spectrum 
of individual and employer characteristics is included. This paper uses five dummies to 
characterise the educational background, age and age square as indicators for 
                                                          
4 The command cnreg is used in STATA.  
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experience, tenure, a dummy for foreigners and for females, sixteen sector dummies, and 
year dummies. 
5 Results 
The censored earnings regressions lead to the expected correlations of the covariates to 
earnings: education level, tenure, and (with a decreasing rate) age have a positive impact 
on earnings while prior non-employment spells decrease earnings. Foreigners earn less 
than German citizens and females earn less than males (compare Table 1). Already three 
years before the separation, earnings are significantly lower for those who experience a 
non-employment spell later. The reason might be that those who lose their job later on are 
have negative unobservables or that the employers for whom they work pay less. The 
earnings loss increases to 6% one year before the unemployment (see the first column in 
Table 1). One year after the separation, a large portion of the earnings loss is already made 
up again and two years after the separation, those who experienced unemployment but 
found a new job again even have higher earnings than those who did not experience an 
unemployment spell. We have to deduct the negative unemployment spell effect from the 
coefficient, however. The earnings mark-up even reaches 7% after six years.  This is only 
slightly less than the earnings punishment for those not employed for between 15 and 30 
days – this means that those with non-employment spells less than 15 days are better off 
after six years while those with non-employment spell longer than 30 days still have lower 
earnings than those without non-employment spells. 
 If we split the sample into different age groups, we observe the following patterns: 
relative earnings losses with non-employment decline stronger with age (compare 
columns two to five in Table 1 or Figure 1). The first aspect is that older employees earned 
more several years before the non-employment spell than their colleagues who did not 
experience a non-employment spell later on – obviously this group of employees is not a 
negative selection nor did employers that shed employees more than four years later 
already pay less. The youngest group of those employees who experience non-
employment later consistently has an earnings disadvantage between one and three 
percent in all six years before the non-employment spell. At least in their age cohort these 
employees have therefore unobservable negative characteristics or they work at 
employers with a lower earnings level.  
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After the non-employment spell, the pattern is the opposite – the youngest cohort 
enjoys a positive earnings mark-up in comparison to the reference group (at least after 
deducting the wage loss directly induced by non-employment) already one year after the 
non-employment spell. This earnings bonus even increases to more than 10 percent six 
years after the non-employment spell (which neutralises the earnings losses incurred by a 
non-employment spell between 61 and 100 days in this age cohort). The age cohort 
between 50 and 59 years never really recovers from the earnings loss after a non-
employment spell. Only in the sixth year after the non-employment spell the earnings loss 
is not significantly lower than zero any more – an employee who had a non-employment 
spell between 61 and 100 days six years before still suffers an earnings loss of almost 11 
percent, however). The other two age cohorts lie between both extremes. Jacobson et al. 
(1983) find rather small differences between the earnings losses of employees from 
different age groups. They also stress, however, that younger employees recover sooner 
from earnings losses after separation. 
 In order to further investigate what the reasons of the higher earnings losses of 
older employees might be, additional interaction terms are added between the dummies 
flagging the time distance to the non-employment spell and a dummy indicating that the 
employee was re-hired by the same enterprise as before the non-employment spell, 
compare Table 2. The first result is that at least one year before the separation, the 
interaction term is positive for all age cohorts (with a declining coefficient with age, see 
Figure 2). This means that those employees who are re-hired are a positive selection from 
the group of employees facing non-employment. The interaction coefficient is also positive 
for the youngest cohort after the unemployment spell. It is however negative in the range 
between three and six percent for the older age groups. One might interpret this as 
evidence for the importance of the argument that older employees re-enter enterprises 
that had dismissed them because they have been in economic trouble (and therefore also 
had to reduce their earnings level). The alternative hypotheses – older employees suffer 
higher earnings losses because potential new employers suppose that they are less 
capable, have negative unobservable characteristics, lose more specific human capital or 
their seniority wage mark-up are therefore not supported. 
 If we analyse the earnings differentials of men and women separately (see Table 3), 
we find that women who return to the labour market after a non-employment spell suffer 
lower earnings losses than men. This is also found by Jacobson et al. (1983). Before the 
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non-employment spell the earnings losses are lower for women than for men (beside the 
oldest cohort) and after the non-employment spell the earnings recover quicker and 
stronger for women (again the picture is not so clear for the oldest cohort). 
6 Conclusions 
This paper shows that earnings losses suffered after non-employment spells increase with 
the age of employees. In order to show this, the impact of non-employment spells on 
earnings is calculated for the period six years before until six years after the spell. The 
higher earnings losses of older employees result from several facts. The relative earnings 
position with respect to employees without non-employment spells several years before 
the separation is better for older employees. This earnings mark-up turns into a high 
earnings loss shortly before the unemployment spell. Young employees face a relatively 
low and constant earnings disadvantage in the years before the separation. After the non-
employment spell the younger re-employed enjoy a wage higher than that of those without 
unemployment spells. This earnings advantage increases to more than 10 percent after six 
years – it neutralises a non-employment spell between 15 and 30 days. The older age 
cohorts see their relative earnings further reduced after the unemployment spell – even 
after six years there are earnings losses that have to be added to the earnings 
disadvantage incurred by the non-employment spell. From these findings the paper 
deducts that younger employees can improve their match by changing employers even if 
this includes a non-employment spell. In addition, younger employees who experience a 
separation are a group with lower earnings taking the observables into account. Older 
employees who have a non-employment spell later on are a more positive selection from 
their peer group. After their non-employment spell, they see their earnings position eroded 
either because they have to accept a worse match or because the new employer pays 
them less irrespective of their relatively high productivity. Both facts points to the 
hypothesis that non-employment of older employees is less frequently voluntary than non-
employment of younger employees. If we look at the earnings mark-up for those who re-
enter the labour market after non-employment at the same employer, this hypothesis 
seems to be supported. The interaction term is positive for the youngest cohort and 
negative for the oldest cohort – this might be a consequence of the employers of older 
employees setting free and re-hiring their employees because they are in economic trouble 
and therefore paying less. Other common hypotheses for the higher earnings losses of 
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older employees are not supported – for earnings losses induced by losses in human 
capital, seniority wage mark-ups or the uncertainty on unobservable characteristics the 
interaction term might have been more positive for the older than the younger employees 
with separations. 
This paper cannot distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separations. In 
addition only few details on establishment characteristics can be included. It seems 
promising, however, to separate the impact of individual and employer characteristics on 
the earnings losses. We need linked employer employee data for this or at least 
information on the complete workforce of establishments. 
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Figure 1: Earnings before and after a non-employment spell in comparison to employees 
with uninterrupted employment, separated by age group 
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Figure 2: Deviations from earnings losses for those who re-start at the same employer after 
unemployment, separated by age group 
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Table 1: Impact of unemployment spells on earnings, dependent variable: log earnings  
 Age 20-60 Age 20-29 Age 30-39 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Unemployment spell 15 until 30 days -0.083   *** -0.079   *** -0.090   *** 
Unemployment spell 31 until 60 days  -0.103   *** -0.092   *** -0.107   *** 
Unemployment spell 61 until 100 days  -0.115   *** -0.105   *** -0.122   *** 
Unemployment spell 101 until 200 days -0.166   *** -0.139   *** -0.168   *** 
Unemployment spell 201 until 365 days  -0.218   *** -0.173   *** -0.228   *** 
Unemployment spell 366 until 730 days -0.204   *** -0.152   *** -0.196   *** 
Unemployment spell more than days 731 -0.248   *** -0.184   *** -0.229   *** 
Employed at the same employer after separation -0.004   *** 0.044   *** 0.003   * 
6 years before separation 0.021   *** 0.012    0.007    
5 years before separation 0.009   * -0.002    -0.001    
4 years before separation 0.001    -0.014   ** -0.006    
3 years before separation -0.009   ** -0.014   ** -0.017   *** 
2 years before separation -0.027   *** -0.016   *** -0.035   *** 
1 year before separation -0.056   *** -0.030   *** -0.070   *** 
1 year after separation -0.004   *** 0.056   *** -0.020   *** 
2 years after separation 0.024   *** 0.078   *** 0.018   *** 
3 years after separation 0.043   *** 0.087   *** 0.045   *** 
4 years after separation  0.053   *** 0.092   *** 0.065   *** 
5 years after separation  0.064   *** 0.098   *** 0.080   *** 
6 years after separation  0.073   *** 0.107   *** 0.086   *** 
School degree, no professional degree 0.073   *** 0.070   *** 0.055   *** 
Professional degree, secondary school degree 0.265   *** 0.245   *** 0.235   *** 
Professional degree, tertiary school degree 0.475   *** 0.377   *** 0.476   *** 
University, university of applied sciences 0.691   *** 0.528   *** 0.657   *** 
Foreigner -0.105   *** -0.070   *** -0.142   *** 
Tenure in years 0.011   *** 0.051   *** 0.012   *** 
Age 0.050   *** 0.133   *** 0.066   *** 
Age x Age -0.001   *** -0.002   *** -0.001   *** 
Female -0.245   *** -0.118   *** -0.254   *** 
Constant 2.808   *** 1.566   *** 2.640   *** 
16 economic sector dummies, year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number observations  4865091 1448445 1586082 
Pseudo R2 0.2715 0.2657 0.2448 
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Table 1 (continued)  
 Age 40-49 Age 50-59 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
Unemployment spell 15 until 30 days -0.080   *** -0.088   *** 
Unemployment spell 31 until 60 days  -0.101   *** -0.108   *** 
Unemployment spell 61 until 100 days  -0.109   *** -0.106   *** 
Unemployment spell 101 until 200 days -0.171   *** -0.172   *** 
Unemployment spell 201 until 365 days  -0.215   *** -0.205   *** 
Unemployment spell 366 until 730 days -0.208   *** -0.240   *** 
Unemployment spell more than days 731 -0.245   *** -0.355   *** 
Employed at the same employer after separation -0.017   *** -0.061   *** 
6 years before separation -0.004    0.071   ** 
5 years before separation -0.006    0.029    
4 years before separation -0.008    0.013    
3 years before separation -0.022   *** 0.002    
2 years before separation -0.054   *** -0.028   ** 
1 year before separation -0.085   *** -0.058   *** 
1 year after separation -0.076   *** -0.098   *** 
2 years after separation -0.040   *** -0.069   *** 
3 years after separation -0.015   *** -0.046   *** 
4 years after separation  0.000    -0.033   *** 
5 years after separation  0.025   *** -0.021   *** 
6 years after separation  0.046   *** -0.0002    
School degree, no professional degree 0.095   *** 0.075   *** 
Professional degree, secondary school degree 0.284   *** 0.268   *** 
Professional degree, tertiary school degree 0.549   *** 0.545   *** 
University, university of applied sciences 0.763   *** 0.786   *** 
Foreigner -0.103   *** -0.082   *** 
Tenure in years 0.003    0.036   *** 
Age 0.036   *** 0.050   *** 
Age x Age -0.0003   *** -0.0004   *** 
Female -0.324   *** -0.327   *** 
Constant 3.117   *** 2.775   *** 
16 economic sector dummies, year dummies Yes Yes 
Number observations (censored) 1198550 708830 
Pseudo R2 0.2574 0.2268 
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Table 2: Impact of unemployment spells on earnings, dependent variable: log earnings 
 Age 20-60 Age 20-29 Age 30-39 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Unemployment spell 31 until 60 days  -0.106   *** -0.087   *** -0.108   *** 
Unemployment spell 61 until 100 days  -0.115   *** -0.096   *** -0.120   *** 
Unemployment spell 101 until 200 days -0.171   *** -0.133   *** -0.169   *** 
Unemployment spell 201 until 365 days  -0.223   *** -0.166   *** -0.229   *** 
Unemployment spell 366 until 730 days -0.211   *** -0.155   *** -0.199   *** 
Unemployment spell more than days 731 -0.255   *** -0.193   *** -0.234   *** 
6 years before separation 0.004    -0.008    -0.015    
5 years before separation -0.001    -0.022   * -0.009    
4 years before separation -0.009    -0.021   ** -0.018   * 
3 years before separation -0.016   *** -0.020   ** -0.025   *** 
2 years before separation -0.031   *** -0.023   *** -0.042   *** 
1 year before separation -0.060   *** -0.035   *** -0.077   *** 
1 year after separation -0.014   *** 0.048   *** -0.026   *** 
2 years after separation 0.018   *** 0.073   *** 0.014   *** 
3 years after separation 0.040   *** 0.089   *** 0.043   *** 
4 years after separation 0.048   *** 0.089   *** 0.063   *** 
5 years after separation 0.060   *** 0.096   *** 0.075   *** 
6 years after separation 0.069   *** 0.108   *** 0.080   *** 
6 years before separation*same employer -0.044    0.004    -0.017    
5 years before separation*same employer -0.035   * 0.015    -0.046    
4 years before separation*same employer -0.011    0.004    -0.015    
3 years before separation*same employer -0.013    -0.002    0.0006    
2 years before separation*same employer -0.013    0.021    0.006    
1 year before separation*same employer 0.014   ** 0.044   *** 0.035   *** 
1 year after separation*same employer -0.006    0.041   *** 0.002    
2 years after separation*same employer -0.015   *** 0.042   *** -0.009    
3 years after separation*same employer -0.015   *** 0.040   *** -0.009    
4 years after separation *same employer -0.003    0.050   *** 0.0009    
5 years after separation*same employer 0.007    0.038   *** 0.030   *** 
6 years after separation*same employer 0.007    0.015    0.044   *** 
School degree, no professional degree 0.076   *** 0.055   *** 0.059   *** 
Professional degree, secondary school degree 0.274   *** 0.251   *** 0.240   *** 
Professional degree, tertiary school degree 0.493   *** 0.389   *** 0.488   *** 
University, university of applied sciences 0.713   *** 0.535   *** 0.674   *** 
Foreigner -0.117   *** -0.079   *** -0.156   *** 
Tenure in years 0.024   *** 0.042   *** 0.028   *** 
Age 0.048   *** 0.097   *** 0.071   *** 
Age x Age -0.0005   *** -0.001   *** -0.0009   *** 
Female 0-.239   *** -0.103   *** -0.244   *** 
Constant 2.957   *** 2.152   *** 2.657   *** 
16 economic sector dummies, year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number observations  3607943 979819 1190802 
Pseudo R2 0.2622 0.2622 0.2358 
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Table 2 (continued)  
 
 
 Age 40-49 Age 50-59 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
Unemployment spell 31 until 60 days  -0.106   *** -0.128   *** 
Unemployment spell 61 until 100 days  -0.111   *** -0.124   *** 
Unemployment spell 101 until 200 days -0.176   *** -0.186   *** 
Unemployment spell 201 until 365 days  -0.222   *** -0.211   *** 
 Unemployment spell 366 until 730 days -0.211   *** -0.244   *** 
Unemployment spell more than days 731 -0.241   *** -0.360   *** 
6 years before separation -0.021    0.092    
5 years before separation -0.021    0.046    
4 years before separation -0.019    0.020    
3 years before separation -0.029   *** 0.006    
2 years before separation -0.052   *** -0.036   ** 
1 year before separation -0.090   *** -0.073   *** 
1 year after separation -0.083   *** -0.107   *** 
2 years after separation -0.042   *** -0.074   *** 
3 years after separation -0.015   *** -0.044   *** 
4 years after separation -0.002    -0.030   *** 
5 years after separation 0.025   *** -0.014   * 
6 years after separation 0.046   *** 0.008    
6 years before separation*same employer -0.038    -0.108    
5 years before separation*same employer -0.018    -0.037    
4 years before separation*same employer 0.016    -0.024    
3 years before separation*same employer -0.0008    -0.018    
2 years before separation*same employer -0.013    0.001    
1 year before separation*same employer 0.023   * 0.021    
1 year after separation*same employer -0.021   ** -0.025   * 
2 years after separation*same employer -0.051   *** -0.037   ** 
3 years after separation*same employer -0.048   *** -0.040   ** 
4 years after separation *same employer -0.032   ** -0.029    
5 years after separation*same employer -0.030   ** -0.041   ** 
6 years after separation*same employer -0.025   * -0.061   *** 
School degree, no professional degree 0.115   *** 0.094   *** 
Professional degree, secondary school degree 0.303   *** 0.291   *** 
Professional degree, tertiary school degree 0.572   *** 0.565   *** 
University, university of applied sciences 0.800   *** 0.810   *** 
Foreigner -0.120   *** -0.084   *** 
Tenure in years 0.015   *** -0.020   ** 
Age 0.024   *** 0.071   *** 
Age x Age -0.0002   *** -0.0007   *** 
Female -0.313   *** -0.327   *** 
Constant 3.463   *** 2.310   *** 
16 economic sector dummies, year dummies Yes Yes 
Number observations  910309 572401 
Pseudo R2 0.2538 0.2244 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
 Average Age 20-29 Age 30-39 Age 40-49 Age 50-59 
Earnings 4.151 3.956 4.191 4.232 4.260 
Unemployment spell 15 until 30 days 0.023 0.028 0.025 0.021 0.016 
Unemployment spell 31 until 60 days  0.032 0.037 0.035 0.030 0.024 
Unemployment spell 61 until 100 days  0.033 0.035 0.036 0.032 0.028 
Unemployment spell 101 until 200 days 0.048 0.047 0.052 0.050 0.037 
Unemployment spell 201 until 365 days  0.040 0.031 0.046 0.047 0.031 
Unemployment spell 366 until 730 days 0.033 0.023 0.036 0.038 0.036 
Unemployment spell more than days 731 0.027 0.014 0.029 0.030 0.040 
Employed at the same employer after 
separation 
0.045 0.029 0.050 0.054 0.049 
6 years before separation 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
5 years before separation 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
4 years before separation 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
3 years before separation 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
2 years before separation 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 
1 year before separation 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.010 
1 year after separation 0.018 0.021 0.021 0.017 0.012 
2 years after separation 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.009 
3 years after separation 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.007 
4 years after separation  0.008 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.007 
5 years after separation  0.007 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.006 
6 years after separation  0.006 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.005 
School degree, no professional degree 0.219 0.216 0.200 0.224 0.252 
Professional degree, secondary school 
degree 
0.647 0.669 0.622 0.651 0.654 
Professional degree, tertiary school degree 0.037 0.050 0.048 0.026 0.014 
University, university of applied sciences 0.075 0.038 0.112 0.081 0.058 
Foreigner 0.120 0.144 0.113 0.113 0.108 
Tenure in years 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 
Age 37.673 25.212 34.244 44.251 54.103 
Female 0.351 0.428 0.335 0.324 0.297 
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Table 3: Separation dummies by gender 
  Years before separation Years after separation 
Age  6 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 
20-59 
Women -0.034 * -0.019  -0.027 ** -0.027 *** -0.034 *** -0.052 *** -0.003  0.025 *** 0.045 *** 0.053 *** 0.065 *** 0.072 *** 
Men 0.014  -0.001  -0.005  -0.013 *** -0.032 *** -0.058 *** -0.026 *** 0.005 ** 0.026 *** 0.038 *** 0.052 *** 0.063 *** 
20-29 
Women -0.053 ** -0.031  -0.026  -0.038 *** -0.030 ** -0.039 *** 0.053 *** 0.075 *** 0.090 *** 0.095 *** 0.102 *** 0.105 *** 
Men 0.009  -0.018  -0.022 ** -0.019 ** -0.022 *** -0.030 *** 0.053 *** 0.082 *** 0.096 *** 0.095 *** 0.100 *** 0.113 *** 
30-39 
Women -0.026  -0.021  -0.026  -0.005  -0.018  -0.031 *** 0.008  0.033 *** 0.055 *** 0.068 *** 0.076 *** 0.072 *** 
Men -0.013  -0.014  -0.019 ** -0.030 *** -0.048 *** -0.085 *** -0.045 *** 0.000  0.030 *** 0.055 *** 0.076 *** 0.090 *** 
40-49 
Women -0.022  -0.010  -0.020  -0.029  -0.050 *** -0.078 *** -0.047 *** -0.011  0.014 * 0.025 *** 0.050 *** 0.076 *** 
Men -0.021  -0.026 * -0.010  -0.023 ** -0.051 *** -0.082 *** -0.110 *** -0.076 *** -0.051 *** -0.035 *** -0.007  0.014 *** 
50-59 Women -0.019  -0.012  -0.067  -0.046  -0.049  -0.100 *** -0.122 *** -0.086 *** -0.051 *** -0.040 *** -0.028 ** -0.014  
Men 0.087 * 0.061 * 0.043 * 0.023  -0.020  -0.043 *** -0.100 *** -0.078 *** -0.053 *** -0.038 *** -0.030 *** -0.011  
 
 
